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ABSTRACT: 
Introduction 
The 2015 earthquake in Nepal killed over 8,000 people, injured more than 21,000 and displaced a 
further 2 million.  One year later, a national workshop was organised with various Nepali 
stakeholders involved in the response to the earthquake.  The workshop provided participants an 
opportunity to reflect on their experiences and sought to learn lessons from the disaster. 
Methods 
135 participants took part and most had been directly involved in the earthquake response.  They 
included representatives from the Ministry of Health, local and national government, the armed 
forces, non-governmental organisations, health practitioners, academics, and community 
representatives.  Participants were divided into seven focus groups based around the following 
topics: water, sanitation and hygiene, hospital services, health and nutrition, education, shelter, 
policy and community.  Facilitated group discussions were conducted in Nepalese and the key 
emerging themes are presented. 
Results 
Participants described a range of issues encountered, some specific to their area of expertise but 
also more general issues. These included logistics and supply chain challenges, leadership and 
coordination difficulties, impacts of the media as well as cultural beliefs on population behaviour 
post-disaster. Lessons identified included the need for community involvement at all stages of 
disaster response and preparedness, as well as the development of local leadership capabilities and 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ? ‘ĚŝƐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐǁĂƐ
observed, which may result in ineffective, poorly planned disaster response. 
Conclusion 
Finding time and opportunity to reflect on and identify lessons from disaster response can be 
difficult but are fundamental to improving future disaster preparedness.  The Nepal Earthquake 
National Workshop offered participants the space to do this.  It garnered an overwhelming sense of 
wanting to do things better, of the need for a Nepal-centric approach and the need to learn the 
lessons of the past to improve disaster management for the future. 
Conference report: Nepal earthquake: lessons learned one year on. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The April 2015 earthquake in Nepal killed over 8,000 people, injured more than 21,000 and 
displaced a further 2 million.  One year later, in May 2016, a national workshop was organised that 
aimed to provide participants with an opportunity to reflect on their experiences and collate insights 
that could be used to inform response to and recovery from future disasters.  Of note, this 
ǁŽƌŬƐŚŽƉ ?ƐƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚĨŽĐƵƐǁĂƐŽŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐůĞƐƐŽŶƐůĞĂƌŶĞĚĨƌŽŵĂEĞƉĂůŝƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
international perspective. We report here on the key emergent themes from the workshop and 
ĞǆƉůŽƌĞŚŽǁƚŚĞƐĞĐĂŶĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽEĞƉĂů ?ƐĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? 
The key justification for this workshop is the need to capture learning from disasters in order to build 
the evidence base for disaster management.(1-3). It has been previously reported that there is a real 
paucity in the published academic literature on disaster management particularly from Low- and 
Middle-Income Countries (LMIC).(1) Indeed, a large proportion of the evidence-base consist of grey 
literature, mostly from programme reports and evaluations by non-governmental organisations. 
However, these are often poorly indexed and difficult to retrieve or trace. It is also difficult to 
validate the rigour of the data collection or objectivity of their reporting.  Furthermore, disasters by 
their very nature are not easy to predict and study. The collation of insights and experience from 
disasters is therefore an essential post-disaster priority.  
 
METHODS 
The workshop was coordinated by Nepali and UK academics, a local and international NGO (PHASE 
Nepal and EcoHimal) and took place in the Nepal capital, Kathmandu. Nepali participants were 
invited from a wide range of backgrounds including community representatives, health and 
education professionals and government officials.  135 participants attended which included 
representatives from the Ministry of Health, local and national government, the armed forces, local 
NGOs, health and education professionals, community representatives and other specialists such as 
engineers or water and sanitation experts. Most of the participants were Nepali and the main 
language used was Nepalese.  Although the majority of participants were male, there were female 
representatives on all groups.   
The workshop was split into two formats with key note presentations in the morning and focused 
sector-based group discussions in the afternoon.  The group discussions provided all participants the 
opportunity to share experiences and insights, and to provide suggestions for improving and 
developing future disaster response. The discussion groups were organised by theme and 
participants were placed in the particular group relevant to their expertise, knowledge or 
experience.  In all there were seven groups clustered around: water, sanitation and hygiene, hospital 
services, health and nutrition, education, shelter, policy and community.  Group discussions were 
facilitated and participants were encouraged to discuss the issues and difficulties encountered in 
responding to the earthquake and potential solutions or lessons to be learned if similar disasters 
were to happen in the future.  
 
FINDINGS 
Healthcare issues 
In disaster-affected areas, service provision of health care was compromised. The destruction of 
village health posts in rural areas, compounded by the pre-existing lack of health workers, made the 
provision of even basic health care in the immediate aftermath difficult. Earthquake damage to 
hospitals meant that many staff and patients were too frightened to remain inside so patients 
waited, were examined and treated outside hospital buildings.  There were also reports of a lack of 
ability to deal with the number of patients arriving for treatment as there were insufficient staff, 
equipment and medical supplies.  Those working in rural areas also reported difficulties in referring 
patients on to more specialist centres due to landslides.  
There were also issues with supplying health facilities in affected areas. Relief tents did not arrive 
until a few days after the earthquake.   Medical supplies were either buried under damaged hospital 
buildings or staff were reluctant to retrieve them as buildings were felt to be too dangerous to enter.  
That said, some people were able to recover some medicines out of destroyed health posts. There 
were also anecdotal reports of supplies having been stolen on route.  The government sought to 
address the medical supplies problem by providing funds to hospitals to purchase further supplies. 
However, it was felt that the direct provision of supplies instead of cash would have been more 
beneficial. 
It was reported that although there were disaster policies and preparedness documents in place and 
many knew the theoretical approach required, when the earthquake happened it was very difficult 
ƚŽƉƵƚƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇŝŶƚŽƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨ ‘ĚƌŝůůŝŶŐ ?ŽƌĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐƚĞƐƚŝŶŐŽƵƚ
the theory before being needed for real.  When it was tested for real by the earthquake disaster, 
staff were not prepared and disaster policies and protocols did not work.  A lack of leadership and 
coordination amongst medical staff were identified to be some of the key issues. This led to 
suggestions that medical staff needed further training in leadership and management skills for 
disasters.   It was also observed that in some areas where there were pre-existing links between 
local NGOs and villages aid in these areas could be more quickly mobilised. 
 
 
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene issues 
There were notable issues with water availability in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. In 
urban areas, people were afraid to return to their houses to access water, or the lack of electricity 
meant they were unable to activate water supply machinery. In rural areas, many water sources 
dried up as a result of the earthquake and accessing enough water became the main focus of many 
ƌƵƌĂůǀŝůůĂŐĞƌƐ ?ůŝǀĞƐ ?After the first couple of days, aid agencies supplied water tanks but there were 
questions regarding the quality of water supplied via the tanks and the lack of ability to test or be 
reassured of the water quality.  Ongoing power supply issues affected those relying on pumps to 
source their water. It was also observed that hygiene practices, such as boiling water, were not 
considered a priority by most of the disaster-affected people.  The lack of toilet facilities for those 
whose houses had been destroyed, or for those too afraid to return to their houses meant that open 
defecation was considered a big issue particularly in settlement areas before adequate sanitation 
could be built.  Of particular note, pre-existing local cultural beliefs about human waste practices 
deterred some from digging their own sanitation facilities.  
 
The role of the education sector  
In the aftermath of the earthquake many people congregated in school buildings or on school land. 
Of note, many looked to the teachers to take charge of the situation.  Many participants spoke of the 
role the teachers played in providing a calming and reassuring presence to others despite their own 
fears and uncertainties. This unique community leadership role in rural communities that teachers 
play, as was revealed by the disaster, highlighted a need to give the teachers adequate training and 
knowledge about what to do in the event of an earthquake. Moreover, as the school premises were 
used as a community focal point and refuge, it was felt that it was essential that school buildings are 
earthquake resistant.  
The village school also played another important role  ? that of restoring a sense of normality to 
affected communities. Initially, schools did not open for some time after the earthquake as families 
dealt with more immediate concerns such as shelter and food. However, it emerged that children 
were often apprehensive or frightened particularly given the number of aftershocks experienced. 
When school was restarted, it was observed that just coming to school, even if not for any real 
lessons, helped to alleviate some of the fears the children had.   
The lack of community awareness as to what to do in disasters and afterwards was also highlighted. 
This led to suggestions that disaster mitigation and response needed to be incorporated into the 
school curriculum. 
 
Community resilience and engagement 
External help often took several days to arrive that meant the disaster-affected communities had to 
look to themselves and their neighbours for aid.  This highlights the importance of the communitŝĞƐ ? 
capacity for self-help and mutual support. However, it was also observed that NGO and government 
ƉƌŽŵŝƐĞƐŽĨĂŝĚĐŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞůĞĚƚŽĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇĂŶĚ ‘ǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ?ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐĨŽƌŚĞůƉƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŐĞƚƚŝŶŐŽŶ
and helping themselves.  Public expectations were also greater than what resources were actually 
available, and they were concerned about the quality of donor goods distributed.   
Consequently, there was a demand for better preparedness at the community level, for all disasters 
and not just earthquakes. A cohesive community was considered to be an essential resource for 
disaster response and recovery.  A wide range of individual and community-level solutions were also 
offered for future disaster preparedness such as the establishment of local collection and storage 
points for aid, community warning systems and community-led clubs or groups responsible for 
immediate disaster response.  Several groups also thought that communities having an essential 
ƐƚŽƌĞŽĨŐŽŽĚƐ ‘ŝŶĐĂƐĞŽĨĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌ ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂůĨŽƌƵƐĞŝŶĂŶǇŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĂĨƚĞƌŵĂƚŚƵŶƚŝů
general aid was available.  
However, it was felt that pre-disaster there was a lack of community-focussed disaster preparedness 
or planning. National policies were not always thought to be relevant and were patchily adopted and 
implemented. The participants felt that if there had been more involvement and engagement of the 
community in disaster preparedness and planning at a regional and national level, then the 
community could have responded and dealt with the consequences of the earthquake in a more 
efficient and organised manner.  Participants felt that disaster response coordination and 
distribution of aid with community input, or the devolution of authority for decision making to 
communities would have enabled a speedier and more targeted local response. The response would 
likely be more appropriate and would have been more likely to reach all affected communities 
ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞ ‘ĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞƌŽĂĚ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĂĐĐĞƐƐďǇĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? Greater 
community engagement could also enable the development of links between community and 
national bodies, help to raise national awareness of local needs, and improve national confidence in 
local ability to receive and distribute aid. 
 
Role of the Media 
The public health role of the media was also discussed. It was noted that the media played a role in 
raising awareness around good hygiene practice post-disaster. However, in some instances, health 
promotion messages were misunderstood by the target population. For example, it was recounted 
how some people thought they had to ingest chlorine tablets beĨŽƌĞĚƌŝŶŬŝŶŐ ‘ƵŶƐĂĨĞ ?ǁĂƚĞƌ ? 
Similarly, pre-disaster risk reduction messages were also misinterpreted such as the advice given to 
the public to seek shelter under beds during an earthquake  ? there are reports of many who during 
the earthquake ran from the relative safety outdoor into their more unsafe homes in order to 
shelter under their beds.   
The media could also have a negative role. Rumours about perceived inequities in aid distribution 
could also be compounded by the media that created tensions between communities who may or 
may not have received donations.  Media-led stories around the likelihood of further earthquakes 
occurring also increased public anxiety. Some participants felt that this may in turn have contributed 
to increased mental health issues and adverse coping strategies such as alcohol and substance 
misuse. 
 
Reconstruction challenges 
The earthquake resulted in hundreds of thousands left homeless. With the impending monsoon 
season and winter afterwards, in the first few months after the earthquake shelter was seen to be a 
high priority. Moreover, it was widely acknowledged that there is a need to build more earthquake-
resistant housing. However the reconstruction process has been challenging and there were 
criticisms of government reconstruction policies. For example, the government had bought tents 
instead of locally sourced building materials that was felt to be more sustainable. Government 
regulations could also impede rebuilding, such as the requirement for all health posts to be 
accessible for the disabled but this was felt not to be always possible or appropriate particularly in 
mountainous villages.  The lack of information of the physical geography of the affected areas also 
meant it was not possible to ascertain which areas were especially hazardous Žƌ ‘ƐĂĨĞ ?ĨŽƌƌĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ
to be authorised.  Most participants felt that reconstruction would be much more efficiently 
coordinated at a local level, including identification of those in need, rather than at the national or 
regional level.  One agency had done this and felt reconstruction had run much more smoothly as a 
result.   
 
Coordination and distribution of aid 
The coordination and management of the many aid agencies was reported to be an issue. Difficulties 
in communication systems between rural and urban centres meant it took time to assess the extent 
of the damage and understand the relief or support that was needed.  This was compounded by a 
lack of baseline information or knowledge on local need or resources. /ŶƐƚĞĂĚĂ ‘ďůĂŶŬĞƚ ?ĂƉproach 
to relief provision was adopted by the government that meant that efforts to identify those in 
greatest need, or finding the most appropriate relief provision, were limited. As a consequence, it 
was reported that in some disaster-affected areas there was plentiful supply of food aid by different 
agencies but little awareness of where it should go or which areas should be prioritised to receive it.  
Similarly, there was a seed distribution intended for farmers but due to lack of baseline data about 
the number and type of farmers it is uncertain whether the beneficiaries given seeds were actually 
farmers.   
Coordination issues were aggravated by communication and access difficulties between urban 
 ‘ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĐĞŶƚƌĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƌƵƌĂůǀŝůůĂŐĞƐ ?dŚŝƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐexacerbated by blocked roads due to 
landslides that hampered access to remote areas and added to delays in transporting aid or 
evacuating those who had been seriously injured.  Transported goods did not always reach their 
intended end point, and there were anecdotal reports of aid being stolen, or items of aid being 
diverted from supply trucks at each village they passed through. The distribution of aid materials 
was further hampered by the fuel blockade that occurred between India and Nepal in the months 
after the earthquake which led to widespread fuel shortages within the country.   
Some participants did report having seen good coordination between the local and central 
government. However, there was a feeling that the government had not been proactive enough in 
responding to the disaster.  Supplies were sent when requested but there appeared to be little effort 
to proactively identify needs and to provide supplies in anticipation of requests.  That said there was 
some recognition of the immense difficulty face by the government to coordinate all of the disaster 
responses. It was thus suggested that the government could have devolved power to local governing 
bodies to use local resources that could have helped this process.  
The need for preparedness and planning at all levels was reiterated. The lack of ready technical 
ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞĂŶĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚǁĂƐƌĂŝƐĞĚĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĂŶ ‘ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚĞĂŵ ?ŽŶ
constant stand by to respond to crises should be created. Other practical suggestions raised included 
the need for better data collection and coordination so that relief efforts could be more effectively 
deployed to the areas most in need, better use of existing resources such as medical staff and less 
bureaucracy so that external relief could be utilised quicker and more effectively. 
As iterated above, there was also a need for leadership at both a local and wider level.  In the 
absence of any obvious local leader, school teachers often appeared to step in, or be nominated to 
fill the vacuum, despite their own uncertainties or lack of perceived training for this role.  In 
healthcare environments a perceived lack of leadership led to uncoordinated individual activities 
and no overall oversight or coordination.   
 
Policy 
Despite the presence of a national disaster response policy, most participants felt that this was a 
theoretical policy only with no relevance or applicability to real life in Nepal.   The lack of community 
involvement in policy development and implementation was a recurring criticism.  At present, 
policies were felt to be too centralised, impractical, disregarded vulnerable populations and lacked 
an evidence base.  There was a view emphasised that any policy had to be based on the Nepalese 
context, culture and environment, and could not be simply transplanted from another country for 
use in Nepal as was suggested had happened. It was felt that the current disaster policy was based 
ŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ŝŵĂŐŝŶŝŶŐƐ ?ŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐand not rooted in reality as they had not consulted or listened 
ƚŽ ‘ǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ?ŽƌƚŚŽƐĞŵŽƐƚůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚďǇŶĂƚƵƌĂůĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƐ ?Natural disaster policies were 
also not felt to be a government priority with historical political instability hindering any efforts to 
produce effective outputs to reduce disaster risk and improve disaster response. 
This  ‘disconnect ? between national policy and local experience became apparent following the 
earthquake: both professionals and communities voiced their lack of awareness and knowledge 
ĂďŽƵƚƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĞĚ ‘ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ?ĂŶĚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĞǇƐhould have taken following the earthquake.  
dŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ‘ĚƌŝůůŝŶŐ ?ŽƌƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚŶĞƐƐŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚŐĂƉƐŝŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽƌ
awareness were not identified until the earthquake itself. All participants felt that any disaster 
response policy ŽƌƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚŶĞƐƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘ďŽƚƚŽŵƵƉǁĂƌĚƐ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶg and 
listening to communities and frontline staff before being formulated and tested extensively. 
 
The differences between rural and urban experiences 
Participants also discussed the disparities between rural and urban settings with regards to aid 
provision.  There was a perception that those areas that had a relatively large number of tourists 
received aid more quickly and efficiently, and this generated some disquiet. The targeting of aid to 
certain population subgroups created further tensions within communities. Cultural beliefs meant 
ƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞĚŝĚŶŽƚĐŽŵĞĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĨŽƌƌĞůŝĞĨĂƐƚŚĞǇďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂŝĚǁĂƐŵĞĂŶƚŽŶůǇĨŽƌ ‘ŚŝŐŚ
ĐůĂƐƐ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?
Response and experiences for rural and urban populations were very different reflecting the 
differing availability of resources before, during and after the earthquake, but also in terms of the 
different response to need in the two environments.  Urban populations tended to be better able to 
access resources quicker despite initial problems in the immediate aftermath.  A lack of 
understanding of needs, difficulty in communication and logistics, and a centralised approach to 
response meant that many rural populations did not receive support for several days.   
In the reconstruction phase, although both communities have experienced difficulties in the 
reconstruction process, rural communities have had added difficulties in being allocated resources, 
receiving materials and dealing with regulations that are not always appropriate to a rural 
environment. Once again the need for greater community engagement was iterated so that local 
needs were better understood and addressed.  Devolving more authority for community decision 
making was considered a good way of ensuring aid or reconstruction material reached those most in 
need. 
 
Discussion 
Participants identified a number of issues in the response to the Nepal earthquake that are common 
to disaster response worldwide.  Effective coordination was a key theme. Clear, maintained 
leadership within both a healthcare and wider setting is crucial(4, 5) and their lack can prevent 
confusion or barriers to an effective response (6) ?dŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ ‘ƐƉŽŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐ ?ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƚĂŬĞ
on a leadership role during a disaster such as teachers following the Nepal earthquake, are a useful 
resource and would benefit from recognition of this alongside disaster response training (7); some 
teachers took on this role in Nepal but did not always feel adequately prepared for it.   
Logistical challenges often mean a time lag between the arrival of aid and the event (8) leaving local 
communities to respond to the resulting surge in demand in the best way they can (9).  This is 
particularly the case for rural, hard-to-reach communities who may already have a pre-disaster lack 
of adequate health provision(10) and providing training and support for communities before any 
disaster can help to address this(11).  In Nepal, logistical difficulties were compounded by the theft 
of aid provision en route to communities in need, providing support for the concept of having local 
storage capacity.   
Enhancing disaster preparedness is a key priority of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 2015  ? 2020(12, 13).  It features highly on an Evidence Aid list of research priorities (14) 
emphasising the importance that preparedness plays in reducing adverse outcomes following 
disasters.  The need for community engagement in disaster response and preparedness is widely 
recognised (15)(16)(17, 18) with involvement bringing a variety of potential benefits including local 
storage capacity(19), local health response(20), and community-led health education and 
assistance(11). It helps ensure aid interventions are appropriate to the culture and community in 
which they are provided(21) recognising that certain solutions, such as encouraging communities to 
build their own latrines in Nepal, may not be culturally acceptable.   
However the frequent disconnect between what is needed and what is written into policy is also 
widely recognised(6) resulting in an often ineffective, poorly planned disaster response (10).  
Preparedness requires planning at all levels(9), should be over extended timeframes(22) and should 
be extensively tested with drills and exercises(10).  As was reported to have occurred in Nepal, this is 
not always the case and leads to poor coordination of response, poor leadership, unclear 
distribution of aid and an overall less effective, disjointed response(6, 16, 19). 
Conclusion 
One year on from the 2015 earthquake, this workshop provided an opportunity for participants to 
reflect on their experiences.  Most were directly involved in the earthquake response and all had 
very personal as well as professional insights into what happened and how things could be different 
in the future. There was an overwhelming sense of wanting to do things better; reflections and 
discussions from this workshop are an important step in making this happen. Participants felt that 
some clear lessons were apparent: the need for community involvement at all stages of disaster 
response and preparedness, the need for leadership and coordination and the need for clear and 
consistent communications both to identify need and to provide relief.  Above all participants 
identified the need for a Nepali-centric approach that, whilst recognising good practice and evidence 
from around the world, is built around Nepali culture and context. 
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